Elixir already works with many partners, provides deep DeFi liquidity through deUSD, and stays in close touch with its community. To reward contributors, we use the Potion Distribution System (PDS), which is transparent, fair, and runs smoothly.
Inspired by PDS and Balancer DAO proposal, I propose creating an ELX Maxi Fund to automate and further open up ELX operations. The aim is to move our current contribution-and-participation framework on-chain, add partial automation, and publish performance data so that the DAO and its community can become even more active.
This plan gives the Elixir community a simple, functional system today and helps us prepare for larger-scale DAO activity in the future.
Rationale
Automation & transparency
– Every PDS reward, expense and vault action will leave an on-chain trace, auditable by anyone.
Skin-in-the-game incentives
– Contributors are paid in 0~3month lock ELX, aligning them with DAO value growth.
Hi, thanks for putting this proposal together. I have a few questions regarding implementation responsibilities and accountability:
Who will actually be responsible for implementing the technical components of this proposal (e.g. PDS contract integration, dashboard creation, Safe operations)?
Is there a designated team or set of contributors who have committed to executing this if the proposal passes?
The proposal mentions the creation of an “Elixir Ops” multisig, but the signers are yet to be finalized. Will these signers also be responsible for day-to-day operations and technical execution, or is that to be delegated?
It would be helpful to clarify whether this proposal has backing from contributors who are able and willing to implement it. Otherwise, there is a risk that even if the proposal passes, the execution could stall due to lack of resourcing.
Thank you so much for taking an interest in the proposal. I truly appreciate it.
There is no fixed team or dedicated implementer yet. This proposal is essentially a request for the ELX Foundation and the validators to handle the technical work, while in-depth discussions about operations will take place here in the forum.
For now, the DAO is mostly driven by the Foundation, the validators, and partners, so the “community DAO” layer remains small. The purpose of this proposal is to lay the groundwork for expanding that layer, which is why I set a two-week long discussion period.
Nothing has been decided or pre-arranged, and even if the proposal is rejected, ignored, or fails, I believe it will still serve as an important wake-up call for the DAO. TL;DR : everything is TBD, This proposal is request proposal for Elx.Fnd
Thanks for the clarification — I now better understand the intention behind this proposal.
At this point, I’m opposed in the short term but supportive in the long term.
In the short term, I’m hesitant because the current usage of the PDS is still relatively limited — it’s primarily used for rituals, spells, and the occasional event reward. Given that, I’m concerned that the cost of automating, making things transparent, and operating the system might outweigh the actual utility right now.
In the long run, I think this proposal makes more sense — especially once ELX gains more value and the community becomes more active. At that point, having a more structured, onchain treasury could bring clear benefits.
That said, I don’t think that simply publishing performance data will directly lead to greater community engagement.
While I understand that the proposal aims to lay the groundwork for expanding the currently small “community DAO” layer and includes a two-week discussion period to gather feedback, I remain concerned that it falls short of effectively achieving this goal.
At present, the DAO is still largely driven by the Foundation, validators, and partners like you said earlier but this proposal risks reinforcing that centralization rather than genuinely empowering new contributors. It allocates a significant portion of funds to undefined internal contributors and technical infrastructure without clear, inclusive pathways or incentives to onboard or engage new community members.
Without concrete mechanisms to bring in fresh voices and decentralize decision making, this plan feels premature and costly. Rather than expanding the community DAO layer, it may inadvertently cement control within the existing core group, which goes against the principles of decentralization the proposal claims to support. For these reasons, I oppose it in its current form as it has no explicit plans to engage the wider community such as open calls for contributors, transparent selection processes, education or onboarding programs, or interactive governance mechanisms and it risks reinforcing exclusivity rather than fostering genuine decentralization.
Really thanks for your thoughtful reply
To clarify, this proposal is not about turning Elixir into a fully decentralized Community DAO right away.
It has only two small goals:
1.Create a Maxi Fund for current community contributors
2.Add some simple automation to the PDS.
Put simply, the fund is meant only for the weekly or monthly PDS payouts we already make.
Because the community still has little formal power, the plan is to launch the fund first and then hand control over, step by step.
I think this won’t make the DAO more centralized. Just moving the payouts we already make from the core team to the community. That should reduce, not increase, the core team’s control.
Moreover, because we want to avoid any extra spending that dilute existing contributors, the most practical approach is to request a workable tranche from the Foundation.
I fully support and agree on open contributor recruitment and onboarding programs, and I’d love to hear more concrete ideas. The proposal is admittedly light on details, so I’ll flesh it out over the weekend. If you could add a few specific examples or figures, that would be greatly appreciated.
While the alignment with DAO value is important, we should consider that some contributors—especially newer or more casual ones—might be discouraged by delayed liquidity.
Maybe we could explore a hybrid model—e.g., part locked, part liquid
That’s a valuable point, Thank you.
When I first proposed the lock-up ELX, I had assumed (but forgot to explain) that we would pair it with extra DAO-level performance bonuses tied to KPIs, meaning higher performance would automatically get larger ELX payouts.
Current Spell & Ritual and events is no need a time-based lock-up.
However, as we transition to a more professional operating stage and ELX outflows rise, a lock-up will likely become necessary.
I’ll keep the idea indexed so we can revisit and adopt it if future elx & dao conditions.